1 UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK Case No. 09-50026 In the Matter of: GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION, et al., Debtors. U.S. Bankruptcy Court One Bowling Green New York, New York July 22, 2009 9:45 AM B E F O R E: HON. ROBERT E. GERBER U.S. BANKRUPTCY JUDGE

2 1 2 HEARING re Motion to Reject Lease or Executory Contract 3 HEARING re Motion to Reject Lease, Unexpired Leases of 4 5 Nonresidential Real Property 6 7 HEARING re (Doc. 2647 & 2648) Amended Debtors' Second Omnibus Motion Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. Section 365 to Reject Certain 8 9 Executory Contracts 10 HEARING re Debtors' Third Omnibus Motion Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. 11 Section 365 to Reject Certain Executory Contracts 12 13 HEARIG re Motion of Debtors for Entry of Order Pursuant to 11 14 U.S.C. Section 521 and Fed. R. Bankr. P. 1007(C) Further 15 16 Extending Time to File Schedules of Assets and Liabilities, 17 Schedules of Executory Contracts and Unexpired Leases, and Statements of Financial Affairs 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 Transcribed By: Clara Rubin 25

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6 PROCEEDINGS 1 THE COURT: Good morning. Be seated, please. 2 3 Okay, GM. (Pause) 4 THE COURT: Let's see if we can make some room at the 5 counsel table for everybody who wants room at the counsel 6 7 table, please. MR. LEDERMAN: Good morning, Your Honor. Evan 8 Lederman, Weil, Gotshal & Manges, for the debtors. 9 THE COURT: Good morning, Mr. Lederman. 10 MR. LEDERMAN: Good morning, Your Honor. We have one 11 12 contested matter on today. THE COURT: Yes. 13 MR. LEDERMAN: If Your Honor would like us to start 14 with that, or if you want to go through the uncontested 15 matters? 16 THE COURT: No, normally what I would prefer, 17 Mr. Lederman, is you deal with the uncontested matters, freeing 18 19 me up to take the argument that's necessary or appropriate on the contested one. 2.0 21 MR. LEDERMAN: Go through the uncontested matters first, Your Honor? 22 THE COURT: Yes, sir. 23 MR. LEDERMAN: Okay, sure. The first uncontested 24 25 matter is our -- the debtors' motion to reject certain

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1	unexpired leases of nonresidential real property; that was
2	filed by our co-counsel Jenner & Block. I'll call up Daniel
3	Tehrani to address that motion.
4	THE COURT: All right.
5	Mr. Tehrani is it?
6	MR. TEHRANI: Good morning, Your Honor. My name is
7	Daniel Tehrani, Jenner & Block, as special
8	THE COURT: You want to pull the microphone closer to
9	you?
10	MR. LEDERMAN: Sure.
11	THE COURT: And I think I heard your name but I wasn't
12	sure. Tehrani was it?
13	MR. TEHRANI: Yeah, Tehrani
14	THE COURT: Okay.
15	MR. TEHRANI: from Jenner & Block, special counsel
16	to the debtors, Motors Liquidation Company, formally General
17	Motors, in support of two unopposed motions
18	THE COURT: Can I ask you to speak slower, louder and
19	into the microphone, please?
20	MR. TEHRANI: I'm sorry. In support of two unopposed
21	motions to reject certain executory contracts and unexpired
22	leases. The motions are unopposed and draft orders have been
23	submitted to Your Honor's chambers.
24	THE COURT: Okay, they're granted.
25	Mr. Lederman?

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MR. LEDERMAN: Your Honor, the next uncontested matter is the fourth item on the agenda, the debtors' amended second omnibus motion to reject certain executory contracts. There was one objection that was filed by Macquarie Equipment Finance. The debtors have been able to resolve that objection and they filed a notice of withdrawal. So that objection has been resolved.

There are no other objections to this motion. It is seeking rejection of various contracts, including engineering service contracts, human resources contracts and other related purchase agreements that are not in the best interests of debtors' estate to retain on an ongoing basis.

Seeing that there is no other objection, we ask Your Honor to approve that motion.

THE COURT: Yes, granted.

MR. LEDERMAN: Thank you, Your Honor. The next uncontested matter is also a -- I'm sorry, the next uncontested matter is the motion for the debtors to extend their time to file schedules. We are working with the U.S. Trustee's Office to try and figure out the best format and way to present these schedules following the 363 transaction, and when we decide on a format we'll come back to Your Honor and present that. So at this time we have no further update besides to let you know that we're trying to work out a good format with the United States Trustee's Office.

9 THE COURT: Okay. That's fine. How should we deal 1 2 with that as a matter of docketing and calendaring and so 3 forth, in your view, Mr. Lederman? MR. LEDERMAN: I think we would ask Your Honor to 4 approve the extension while we work out the format with the 5 U.S. Trustee's Office. 6 7 THE COURT: Okay. And you've got a proposed order to do that? 8 MR. LEDERMAN: We do, Your Honor. 9 10 THE COURT: Okay. Fair enough. 11 MR. LEDERMAN: Thank you. The third matter was an 12 adjourned matter; it's an adversary proceeding that will be going forward, I believe, on September 30th at 10:30 a.m., Your 13 Honor. 14 THE COURT: Okay. So --15 MR. LEDERMAN: And that concludes the uncontested and 16 adjourned matters. 17 THE COURT: All right, so now we're down to the third 18 19 omnibus rejection motion, and I assume on that you'll want me 2.0 to grant the unopposed ones and we'll hear argument on the one 21 that is opposed? MR. LEDERMAN: Yes, Your Honor. 22 THE COURT: Stillwater Mining Company? 23 MR. LEDERMAN: Yes, Your Honor. 24 25 THE COURT: All right, it's granted for the non-

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10 objectors. And I'll hear appearances for those who are going 1 2 to appear on Stillwater Mining. 3 MR. NOVOD: Good morning, Your Honor. Gordon Novod of the law firm of Kramer Levin Naftalis & Frankel. I'm joined by 4 my colleague Jennifer Sharret on behalf of the creditors' 5 committee of Motors Liquidation Company. 6 7 THE COURT: Okay, Mr. Novod. MS. HESTON: Good morning, Your Honor. Mary Jo Heston 8 from the law firm of Lane Powell, appearing for Stillwater 9 10 Mining Company. 11 THE COURT: Okay, Ms. Heston. MS. PIAZZA: Good morning, Your Honor. Deborah 12 Piazza, Hodgson Russ, appearing for Stillwater Mining Company. 13 THE COURT: All right, Ms. Piazza. 14 Mr. Lederman, are you going to argue Stillwater Mining 15 on behalf of the debtor? 16 MR. LEDERMAN: I am, Your Honor. 17 THE COURT: Okay. 18 MR. LEDERMAN: Would you like to hear the debtors 19 first or the objector, Your Honor? 2.0 THE COURT: I think on this one I'll hear the debtor 21 first. 22 MR. LEDERMAN: Sure, Your Honor. The debtors submit 23 that this contract, which we propose to reject, is an exercise 24 25 of the debtors' business judgment that is prototypical for 365

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and exactly what Congress intended for a proper rejection to maximize the benefit for the estate and the recovery for the creditors.

What we have here is a metal supply contract for rhodium and palladium that has a floor price on it that requires the debtors to purchase palladium at 300 dollars per ounce, 10,000 ounces per month. It increases in 2010 to 20,000 ounces per month, again at 300 per ounce.

The current spot market on palladium, Your Honor, is south of 250 dollars an ounce. So the debtors right now, if they're forced to continue to perform under this contract, will be required to perform at a loss of approximately 500,000 dollars a month.

It is also important to note that following a 363 transaction the debtors no longer manufacture vehicles; therefore, they have absolutely no use for this metal whatsoever. And what they'd have to do is be forced to go out into the open market and resell this metal at a substantial loss if they're forced to continue performance under the contract.

General Motors, New General Motors, was not interested in purchasing this contract because it had a floor price on it and they would have also been having to perform under the contract at a loss. There were other supply contracts that were assumed and assigned to New GM; they were contracts that

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had metal pricing for palladium and rhodium based on spot market prices. So they're much more advantageous for New General Motors. Those are the ones that they decided to continue forward with.

Contrary to what the objectors state in their papers, it had absolutely nothing to do with the location of the supplier; it had to do with the terms of the contract. The terms of those contracts were a spot market contract. They were much more advantageous. Couple that with the fact, as Your Honor is well aware, the New General Motors is going to be a much more leaner, efficient manufacturer, they have a reduced need for the metal supply. So those two factors were decisive in New General Motors not wanting to continue with the contract of Stillwater. Again, nothing to do with the location of the manufacturers.

I also note that the objectors are majority owned by one of the companies that they reference in their objection as being one of the foreign suppliers that New General Motors is continuing relationship with.

So those two factors, we think, under 365, one, that it's an over-market contract in which the debtors would have to continue to perform at a substantial loss for if Your Honor forced continued performance, and second, that there's absolutely no need for this metal in any case. We think it's a sound exercise of the business judgment of the debtor to seek

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rejection of this contract.

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I'd like to briefly address the objectors' points that they raise in their motion: The first I think we addressed was that it's not a proper exercise of the debtors' business judgment; the second is that the rejection would cause disproportionate harm to Stillwater. Again, as I stated, the post-mitigation loss of the debtors having to continue this contract would be, at a minimum, 500,000 dollars a month, and that assumes that they can even sell this metal in the open market. If they're not able to sell this metal in the open market, the loss could be three million dollars a month for the debtors. That is a substantial risk and a substantial harm that would be caused to the debtors and their estates and would certainly impact recovery for the unsecured creditors, whereas in Stillwater's case we don't deny it's an important contract for that company. Unfortunately, that is the consequences of having a contract with a company that goes through this process.

As they stated in their papers, this contract represents approximately ten percent of their revenue in 2008 and approximately eleven percent of their revenue year to date. So while it's an important contract, it is not an overwhelmingly substantial portion of their business. Their management has stated publicly that they will be able to continue on just fine if this contract is rejected.

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I think the other important issue that's raised in their papers is the contract rejection date, when this rejection will be effective. The debtors propose the rejection date should be July 9th. We filed this motion on July 7th. Stillwater received the notice of motion and the actual motion papers via overnight mail on July 8th. Also, there was communications and negotiations of this contract that started back in Q4 of 2008 and continued up through the debtors' filing.

THE COURT: Pause, please --

MR. LEDERMAN: Sure.

THE COURT: -- Mr. Lederman.

MR. LEDERMAN: Sure.

THE COURT: When I reviewed the papers, it appeared to me that the principal issue was the appropriate rejection date. Did Stillwater Mining ship after you told them that you were about to reject, in other words, after the motion had actually been filed?

MR. LEDERMAN: Stillwater's counsel, I think, will be able to address that, but I believe the answer is that they attempted to ship on July 20th. Certainly the motion was filed well before then. Also, the debtors reached out --

THE COURT: Forgive me, Mr. Lederman. You didn't answer my question.

MR. LEDERMAN: I believe Stillwater attempted to ship

on July 20th. The debtors did not accept that shipment.

THE COURT: All right, so you're not holding rhodium and palladium that they had shipped after the motion was filed?

MR. LEDERMAN: That's correct, not for the month of July, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Well --

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MR. LEDERMAN: There's --

THE COURT: Well, at any time? In other words, to what extent, if any, do I have to figure out what is fair to both sides in terms of paying them for stuff that was shipped and accepted between the time the motion was filed and today?

MR. LEDERMAN: There is nothing that's been accepted

MR. LEDERMAN: There is nothing that's been accepted by the debtors since the motion was filed, Your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. Continue, please.

MR. LEDERMAN: So we contend since, again, the proposed shipment date, as Stillwater put in their objection, was July 20th, we wanted to make sure we got this motion on file and got proper notice to Stillwater well before the proposed ship date. The debtors did that in two matters, Your Honor. First, it was communicated on July 1st to Stillwater that the debtors were intending to reject that contract, they should not ship metals for the month of July. They explained the rationale at that time that it was an over-market contract, the debtors no longer need the supply because they don't manufacture vehicles.

16 Secondly, we filed our motion and they received notice 1 2 well ahead of the --THE COURT: Pause, please --3 4 MR. LEDERMAN: Yes, Your Honor. THE COURT: -- Mr. Lederman. In light of the answer 5 to the question you just gave me that there was no shipment 6 between the time that you first filed the motion and now, what 7 difference does the rejection date make? 8 MR. LEDERMAN: Your Honor, I think Stillwater did 9 attempt to ship on July 20th. The debtors did not accept that 10 11 shipment. So that's why we wanted to make the rejection date 12 prior to this hearing. THE COURT: I see. So your point is that if I didn't 13 make it retroactive, then arguably GM would have been obligated 14 to accept that shipment? 15 16 MR. LEDERMAN: Arguably, Your Honor. We again would contend that this in no way provides any benefit to the estate. 17 So it would still be a pre-petition unsecured claim. 18 19 would not be an administrative expense that would accrue. But 2.0 we wanted to prevent even having to go there and made sure to 21 provide ample advance notice to Stillwater not to ship on July 20th, and that's why we made the date July 9th. 22 THE COURT: All right. Continue, please. 23 MR. LEDERMAN: I think those are the primary arguments 24 25 that the debtors would like to put forth regarding this issue.

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And we think that it is, you know, a prototypical example of 365 for the debtors to reject this contract. While the law and 365 itself is not clear on an effective rejection date, we think there's ample support in the case law for Your Honor making the rejection date retroactive to this hearing and to the order.

We think that Bethlehem Steel, which we cite in our papers, is a case that is directly on point here. It was also a supply contract; in that instance it was for gas. The debtors also were obligated to purchase the gas at a floor price that was well above the current spot market price at that time. They were able to ascertain supply from another gas supplier and they sought rejection of the gas supply a date effective before the hearing. They provided advance notice to the gas supplier, just like the situation is here, and the Court in that case allowed for the retroactive rejection. We would ask for the same relief.

THE COURT: Okay. Thank you.

MR. LEDERMAN: Thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: All right, do I properly assume that it would be Ms. Heston? Oh, forgive me, creditors' committee?

MR. NOVOD: Yes. Again, for the record, Your Honor, Gordon Novod of the law firm of Kramer Levin Naftalis & Frankel on behalf of the committee. Rather than repeat all the comments that the debtors made previously on the record, I just

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want to reiterate for the Court that the creditors' committee supports the debtors' judgment here and their election to reject this contract. There is no benefit for the old estate that the assumption of this contract can have, as the old estate is not in the business of manufacturing cars. I'd also note for Your Honor's benefit that obviously the accrual of administrative expense costs with respect to the assumption of this contract would diminish the wind-down budget, which obviously, based on our prior record of this hearing and the sale hearing which concluded on July 2nd, is of great matter and significance to the creditors' committee.

That said, Old GM should not be in a position where it has to bear the burden of this contract. The debtors, in their business judgment, have elected to reject this contract. And as you've heard from the debtors, they provided notice prior to the attempted shipment date of this month. And it's in the best interest of the debtors and the unsecured creditors of Old GM to reject this contract nunc pro tunc to the date on which the motion was filed.

THE COURT: All right.

MR. NOVOD: Thank you.

Ms. Heston?

MS. HESTON: Thank you. For the record, Mary Jo
Heston appearing for Stillwater Mining Company, Your Honor.

25 One thing that I would like to say at the outset is, in

19 reviewing the papers that have been presented by this debtor, 1 2 there's not a single shred of evidence presented by this debtor 3 to support this decision. There's not a single declaration --4 THE COURT: Do you mean as of the time the motion was originally filed or even now after --5 MS. HESTON: Even now --6 7 THE COURT: -- their reply has been filed? MS. HESTON: -- there's not a single declaration. 8 There's not a single -- it's all ex cathedra statements by 9 10 counsel --11 THE COURT: Yes, but remember, we have a case 12 management order in this case that says that allegations and motion papers are taken as true unless disputed. 13 MS. HESTON: Well --14 THE COURT: Now, to what extent do you factually 15 dispute their contentions that this is a requirements contract, 16 that it has a floor of 300 bucks per ounce, that the contract 17 obligates payments -- excuse me, taking 10,000 ounces -- I'm 18 19 not sure if that's per month or per year -- in 2009, 20,000 in 2.0 2010, and the allegation that the business happened to wind up 21 with your affiliate rather than you? Are those facts -- if I gave you an evidentiary hearing on that, would you be able to 22 23 contest any of those facts? MS. HESTON: I would be able to contest several of 24

those facts, Your Honor.

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THE COURT: Be more specific.

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MS. HESTON: Okay. First of all, all of the statements concerning negotiations on this contract, all of the negotiations on this contract, and there's in the record, in the form of the contract that they put into the record, which by the way had a confidentiality clause in it, there was modifications of the contract, and all discussions related to our contract prior to July 4th when we were first informed of the decision to not assume and assign this contract, reduced --were related to reduction of the quantity. And there was never a single discussion concerning the floor price.

So there are --

THE COURT: Forgive me. You're talking about discussions to modify the existing contract. To what extent, Ms. Heston, do I have factual disputes concerning what the contract provides?

MS. HESTON: You have factual disputes concerning the amount that is currently under the amendment for the contract; it's 7,500. And the parties had been in negotiations in terms of a third amendment. You have disputes in terms of what the decision was and what the context of the decision was, because in every contract on a commodity the parties seek to hedge. And so the question in this case is why did they assume and assign the other two contracts and not assume and assign our particular contract?

21 THE COURT: Forgive me. That's a matter of confession 1 2 and avoidance. And I will take your legal argument on those 3 matters after I ascertain the extent to which I need to give 4 you an evidentiary hearing on disputed facts --MS. HESTON: Okay. 5 THE COURT: -- or whether on undisputed facts the 6 7 debtor has already established its entitlement to rely upon the business judgment rule. 8 MS. HESTON: There is --9 THE COURT: Is there a difference -- forgive me, 10 11 Ms. Heston. Since you're having some delays, if not 12 difficulty, in answering my specific questions, I need to do this just like it's a cross-examination. 13 MS. HESTON: Sure. 14 THE COURT: Do you disagree that the floor on this 15 16 contract is 300 dollars per ounce? MS. HESTON: No. 17 THE COURT: All right. Do you dispute the fact that 18 19 GM no longer makes vehicles? 2.0 MS. HESTON: No. THE COURT: Do you dispute the fact that the price on 21 this is fixed as a floor as compared and contrasted to spot 22 23 pricing? 24 MS. HESTON: No. 25 THE COURT: Do you dispute the fact that one of the

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two other companies that got the business for the palladium and the rhodium is a corporate affiliate of yours?

MS. HESTON: They are a majority owner but they are —they have nothing to do with our management. They are precluded from all management decisions. The fact that they got that contract, we derive no benefit from that, Your Honor. So the — and the fact that it was — that they happen to own stock, it's a publicly traded company, Your Honor. And they have absolutely nothing to do with our mining operations which are wholly U.S.—owned and U.S.—run with U.S. employees.

THE COURT: If I gave you an evidentiary hearing, what would you tell me about the contract that is being rejected being different than what the debtor and the creditors' committee say it provides?

MS. HESTON: I would tell you that, first of all, this concept that's set forth in the reply that there are going to be all of these losses is insulting to the intelligence of anybody that has an even basic rudimentary understanding of commodity pricing. Everyone -- we have a floor in our contract, but if you look there is also a ceiling. And so, for example, in 2008 the pricing was extremely favorable under this contract for the first nine months of 2008. And as set forth in our papers, the pricing on these metals is extremely volatile.

So, you know, and we don't know what the other

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contracts were, but everyone attempts to hedge, and in the commodities market that that hedging sometimes works for you and sometimes works against you. So this whole concept that we're going to project out, based on today's palladium price, what the losses are, is ridiculous.

And I really -- I guess I apologize, but I am offended. We all throw around these concepts of business judgment or adequate protection or all the words that we have used in all of our careers, but those decisions have to be made in -- I think in a business context. And there's nothing in this record in terms of -- and if you look -- I mean, I read every word of your decision, Your Honor. And, you know, if you look at the context of this business judgment rule, I think you have to look at it in the context of preserving U.S. jobs.

And the concept that Old GM and New GM, as set forth in our papers and in the purchase and sale agreement -- this is clearly a joint decision by these parties to assume and assign these contracts.

THE COURT: Well, I think that's a permissible inference for me to draw, but wouldn't it be an equally permissible inference for me to draw that, if Stillwater Mining and its Russian sixty-one percent majority stockholder cared so much about saving U.S. jobs, it would not have been impossible for the sixty-one percent stockholder to say listen, for the same price we'll fill the New GM needs with palladium and

24 rhodium extracted in the U.S. instead of bringing it in from 1 Russia? MS. HESTON: Your Honor, as indicated, the Russian 3 4 majority owner is not involved in any way in our management. They do not -- the parties --5 THE COURT: Do you think your management could have 6 picked up the phone --7 MS. HESTON: No. 8 THE COURT: -- and talked to the Russian parent if 9 10 they're not obligated to listen to orders from the Russian 11 parent? MS. HESTON: No. They don't discuss and there's 12 nobody on our board from them. They're precluded from being on 13 our board because of the Russian ownership. And, candidly, 14 there was a discussion after the decision was made and they're 15 16 laughing at us all. I mean, the thought that, you know -- do you think for one second a Russian company -- if this was a 17 Russian-backed company that they would, you know, have assumed 18 19 the U.S. contract over the Russian contract, I mean, it's 2.0 absurd. 21 So the whole concept of --THE COURT: Did your company offer to give New GM 22 spot -- the same economic deal that the Russian company did? 23 MS. HESTON: They never asked. I talked to my 24 25 client -- first of all, you have to understand, Your Honor,

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what was in the initial pleading was not what was in the reply, which was received at 6 o'clock last night and I barely had a chance to talk to my client. But I talked to them about several factual inaccuracies, including the ones that we have discussed. One of them is that this concept that there was all of these discussions, Your Honor, is simply false. What was discussed was a reduction of the amount of palladium provided to this debtor. They never discussed with our client, according to the parties that I talked to and my client last night, they never discussed a floor price. They never said -and, in fact, as set forth in our declarations, when we received the call for the first time on July 4th and talked to this David -- I forget his last name, I apologize, it's in the declaration -- but talked to the party that we had been dealing with at GM, he was just obviously flabbergasted himself by the decision. He basically said I'm really sorry, the lawyers have made this decision, it's not based on price. That's what he told our client. And I recognize that's hearsay but that's what we were told.

My client has told me that they were never asked -they were never told that the flooring price was the problem
here. And we have shown good faith in renegotiating this
contract, not once, not twice but there was a third amendment
to the contract that had been orally agreed to. And, again, it
was not based on flooring price; it was based on the amount of

palladium to be provided to this debtor for the rest of the year. So until July 4th we were told that our contract was going to be assumed and assigned as part of this process.

And I guess one last thing -- and so I guess I think there is -- I think that, based on this record, there are several factual disputes and that an evidentiary hearing should be held with limited discovery rights.

THE COURT: All right. Thank you.

Reply?

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Mr. Lederman.

MR. LEDERMAN: Thank you, Your Honor. At the outset, the debtors would like to note that we had talked to Stillwater's counsel and we had agreed that this would not be an evidentiary hearing. We explained and we thought the uncontested facts were clear and if Your Honor wished for an evidentiary hearing we could set that for a later date but that we didn't think that that would be necessary.

THE COURT: No, don't focus on what you said to them; focus on what they said back to you. They agreed that it was not going to be an evidentiary hearing?

MR. LEDERMAN: That's correct, Your Honor.

THE COURT: And that today would not be an evidentiary hearing or that there would not be an evidentiary hearing at any point?

MR. LEDERMAN: No, that today would not be an

evidentiary hearing.

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THE COURT: Yeah, but you're not focusing on the distinction I'm making. The question I'm asking is whether the agreement you had with Stillwater Mining's counsel was that merely that today would not be an evidentiary hearing or that the entire controversy could be resolved without an evidentiary hearing.

MR. LEDERMAN: No, just merely that today would not be an evidentiary hearing.

THE COURT: You understand why that's not responsive, then, to what I need to ascertain?

MR. LEDERMAN: I understand, Your Honor. I just wanted to point that at the outset and I'll go into the substantive arguments now.

As Your Honor's well aware, we think under 365 that contract rejection is intended to be a summary hearing to determine whether or not the debtors have made a sound business judgment in seeking to reject the contract.

The undisputed facts here, as Your Honor elicited from Stillwater's counsel, are clear. There is a supply contract for which the debtors have absolutely no use for the supply. They no longer manufacture vehicles; therefore, at any price they wouldn't need it. However, more importantly, the contract terms are clear. It has a floor price of 300 dollars per ounce, 10,000 ounces per month, which escalates to 20,000

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ounces per month. The debtors would be forced to go to those markets --

THE COURT: Pause please, Mr. Lederman.

MR. LEDERMAN: Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Do you agree or disagree with Ms. Heston when she says that you're wrong when you say it's 10,000, it should only be 7,500?

MR. LEDERMAN: We disagree, but even if it was 7,500 we don't think the outcome is any different. So even if we concede that it's 7,500, it's still 7,500 ounces at floor price of 300 for metal that can't be used by the debtors and a spot price that is 50 dollars above what the current market price is. So the post-mitigation loss of the debtors would still be substantial, even at 7,500. So even if we concede that, which we don't think is correct, but we're fine to concede that we don't think the outcome changes.

I also want to bring up the point that, again, the debtors are cognizant and aware that this is an important contract for Stillwater and that it could have an impact on their business and indeed maybe even the local economy. But we think that Judge Gonzalez in Chrysler and the Pilgrims case makes it pretty clear that that is not a determinative factor that this Court should weigh in considering whether or not it's a proper exercise of the debtors' business judgment to reject the contract; it is the harm that it will cause the estate, the

harm that it will cause its creditors.

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And we think here the undisputed facts are clear that if the debtors are forced to continue to perform they would be at a substantial loss; it would be a substantial drain on the estate. We think those are undisputed facts.

We think that having an evidentiary hearing would be a cost that is unnecessary for the debtors. It would be time-consuming and expensive and a further drain on the estate. And we don't think, at all, it changes the outcome. We think the undisputed facts substantiate clearly that the debtors are exercising their sound business judgment in seeking rejection of this contract.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. LEDERMAN: And we think, in fact, it would be a breach of our fiduciary duties if we didn't seek to reject it.

THE COURT: All right.

Mr. Novod, anything further?

MR. NOVOD: Your Honor, Gordon Novod again, for the record. I just wanted to echo our support for the debtors again. This is not a contract which the debtors are going to be using in their business. No administrative expenses should accrue in connection with this contract and we believe that the contract should be rejected as the debtors have requested in their papers.

THE COURT: All right.

MR. NOVOD: Thank you.

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THE COURT: Thank you. All right. We'll take a recess. I want everybody back by 10:30.

(Recess from 10:17 a.m. until 11:30 a.m.)

THE COURT: I apologize for keeping you all waiting.

In this contested matter in the Chapter 11 cases of General

Motors Corporation, now known as Motors Liquidation Corporation

and its affiliates, the debtors move to reject a contract for

the purchase of rhodium and palladium with Stillwater Mining,

described more fully below.

After appropriate consideration, I've determined that there are no material disputed issues of fact and that the motion can and should be decided on the present record without the need for a supplemental evidentiary hearing. The motion is granted.

The following are my findings of fact, conclusions of law and bases for the exercise of my discretion in this regard. As facts, I find that GM, referred to for clarity by many as Old GM and now known as Motors Liquidation Corporation, entered into a requirements contract dated August 8, 2007 with Stillwater Mining for the purchase of palladium and rhodium used in the manufacture of the catalytic converters that are in modern motor vehicles. The contract was twice amended on December 9, 2008 and on March 5, 2009, respectively. See Stark (ph.) Declaration, paragraph 4.

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Under the contract, Old GM was required to accept a fixed amount of palladium at a floor price of 300 dollars per ounce. Old GM was obligated to buy 10,000 ounces per month of palladium in 2009 and 20,000 ounces per month in 2010. See old contract section 4(a). With that price and quantity, the palladium would cost Old GM three million per month in 2009 and six million per month in 2010.

Also, under the original contract Old GM was originally obligated to accept 500 ounces of rhodium each month starting in January 2008 and ending in December 2012. See contract section 4(b). Though the quantities were later changed in the first and second amendments to provide that for the first quarter of calendar 2009, the rhodium quantity would be reduced from 500 to 300 ounces per month and then to 200 ounces in April, zero ounces in May and June. And under the first and then second amendments, various mechanisms were created for a kind of negotiation process to deal with rhodium needs for periods thereafter.

There was some oral argument with respect to different numbers. My findings of fact are based on the numbers as I read them from the underlying contractual documents, although I will find, in the event of any appeal, that the differences would not be material under any circumstances.

Palladium is a commodity, and the spot price for palladium rises and falls with market conditions. At-present

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market conditions, the 300 dollars per ounce that GM would have to pay for the palladium, assuming that Old GM wanted it or needed it, would be substantially above market. As of July 10, the date of the closing of Old GM's recent Section 363 transaction, the spot price was approximately 235 dollars per ounce. The average daily price for palladium during 2009 has been 197 dollars per ounce. See Stillwater Mining's 10-K.

While I well understand that people enter into contract at fixed prices to address the fact that commodity prices go up and down, the undisputed fact is that the contract price is substantially in excess of the sport market price. Also, of course, though this is a hugely important point and perhaps needed to be addressed first, Old GM no longer makes cars and trucks; it does not need the palladium or the rhodium. And under the contract, Old GM -- remember that's Motors Liquidation Company -- is forced to expend three million dollars per month for the remainder of 2009, and six million dollars per month beginning in 2010 for palladium that it does not need or use. I further note, assuming arguendo that it were relevant, that even New GM would not require increased palladium now that what is surviving is downsized, even at the fair market price, much less than the higher-than-market price under this contract.

It's a fair inference to draw that Old GM and New GM conferred when New GM decided which contracts New GM wished to

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assume and that this contract wasn't one of them. But ultimately the decision as to whether to take an assumption of this agreement, and thus to take the agreement itself, was New GM's, not the decision of Motors Liquidation Company. And when this contract wasn't assumed by New GM, Motors Liquidation Company, at the risk of stating the obvious, didn't need the palladium itself.

There is no cure due on the contract. See Stark declaration, paragraph 8. However, it appears that Stillwater Mining attempted to deliver product on or about July 20 and its delivery was refused. Thus, I do not need to deal with what would have happened if GM was holding palladium that had been delivered under the contract in the period in between the time of its motion to reject and the time of this hearing.

Though these facts ultimately are not relevant, I find, for the sake of completeness, that Stillwater is a U.S. manufacturer employing U.S. workers, that two other entities will be supplying the product that Stillwater provided to New GM, one of which is a Russian entity that is the sixty-one percent majority stockholder of Stillwater Mining.

Given Motors Liquidation Company's right to relief under these undisputed facts, I don't need to find additional facts such as what may have been discussed between the parties vis-a-vis a consensual resolution that might have obviated the motion to reject or reasons anyone at Old GM might have given

for its decision to reject.

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Now turning to my conclusions of law and bases for the exercise of my discretion on this motion, I find, as conclusions of law or mixed questions of fact and law, that courts generally will not second-guess a debtor's business judgment concerning the rejection of an executory contract.

See, for example, In re Riodizio 204 B.R. 417, 424 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1997) and In re Farmore 204 B.R. 948, 951-952 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio, 1997) and that the reasons underlying the debtor's business judgment here are both apparent and obvious in fact.

The purpose beyond allowing debtors to reject executory contracts is to allow them to abandon burdensome property. See, for example, In re Orion Pictures, 4 F.3d 1095, 1098, a decision of the Second Circuit, and In re Old Car Co LLC, that being the liquidation name for the former Chrysler Corporation, 2009 B.R. LEXIS 1382, p. 5. Here, Motors Liquidation's business purpose is easy to understand, as counsel for the creditors' committee, supporting the debtors' motion, made clear: Motors Liquidation no longer makes cars and trucks; it doesn't need any product.

Moreover, the contract requires a purchase of palladium and rhodium in minimum quantities that aren't needed. And the price for the palladium is way over the spot price; it's way over market. Even if Motors Liquidation needed the palladium and the rhodium, which it obviously doesn't, it's a

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classic example of a contract that's burdensome to the estate.

Stillwater Mining notes that this contract provides that it was about eleven to twelve percent of its revenue. And I assume that losing this business is indeed a hardship to Stillwater Mining. I understand that and I sympathize with it. But this is, sadly, one of the many decisions that I've been forced to make in this case and in others, and that I may well have to make in the future in this case and in others, where I have to deal with the unfortunate consequences of corporate financial distress. So that others do not suffer even more, the Bankruptcy Code provides means for debtors to shed burdensome obligations, of which this is a classic example.

For purposes of this motion, I must consider the reasons underlying the debtors' business judgment. And even if I were to apply the more rigorous test of what's in the best interests of the estate, I'd have to reach the same conclusion as comments made by creditors' committee's counsel strongly suggest. Likewise, there's, unfortunately or fortunately but simply as a matter of reality, no basis in the law, nor has been any cited to me, for considering hardship to the counterparty on a motion of this character where, for example, Congress hasn't directed us to consider competing considerations, as we're required to consider for collective bargaining agreements, as noted by Judge Lynn in Pilgrim's Pride Corp., 403 B.R. 413, 425 (Bankr. N.D. Texas, 2009), just

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a short time ago: While the impact of rejection on the counterparty's community may be significant, that is not an uncommon result of the cutbacks that typically accompany a restructuring in Chapter 11. Judge Lynn went on to say, in Pilgrim's Pride, whether through contract rejections or plant closings, contraction of a debtor's business will often have a harmful effect for one or more local economies.

If the Bankruptcy Court must second-guess every choice by a trustee or debtor-in-possession that may economically harm any given locale, the business judgment rule applicable to contract rejection and many other decisions in the Chapter 11 process will be swallowed by a public policy exception.

Also, of course, I note that Stillwater Mining will still have the ability to file a proof of claim and presumably to recover on a claim for its resulting rejection damages, a claim for the loss of the profit it would have made under this contract.

Turning then to the matter of the appropriate rejection date, I start with the fact, as I and other courts have held previously, that a bankruptcy court may make its rejection order retroactive under appropriate circumstances, or, putting it in the terms that we more commonly put it, to make its determination nunc pro tunc to the time of the filing of the motion.

I did so for a much longer period in the Adelphia

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Business Solutions case, and my decision to make it retroactive there for a period of several years was ultimately affirmed by the circuit in Adelphia Business Solutions, Inc. v. Abnos, 482 F.3d 602. There the circuit assumed, without deciding, that the power exists, when it noted the decisions of many other courts that had recognized this power. See Pacific Shores Development LLC vs. At Home Corp., In re At Home Corp., 392 F.3d 1064, 1071, (9th Cir. 2004); Thinking Machines Corp. vs. Mellon Financial Services Corp, In re Thinking Machines Corp., 67 F.3d 1021, 1028 (1st Cir. 1995); and Constant Limited Partnership vs. Jamesway Corp., In Re Jamesway Corp., 179 B.R. 33, 39 (S.D.N.Y. 1995).

Here the duration of the requested nunc pro tunc period is very modest, going back only about two weeks to the filing of the motion after Old GM had long before given notice of its intention to reject and where Old GM declined delivery of the product and thus was not unjustly enriched by its contract counterparty providing it with something for which appropriate payment hadn't been made.

In fact, if I had permitted Stillwater Mining to force Motors Liquidation Corp. to accept delivery of product that Motors Liquidation Corp. didn't want or need, that would have been an even more unjust result, especially if Motors Liquidation had then had to dispose of that unneeded product at a loss. Making the effective date of the rejection nunc pro

tunc to the date of the filing of the motion under these facts is the just thing to do. Accordingly, the debtors are to settle an order in accordance with this ruling stating no more than that for the reasons set forth on the record. The motion is granted. The time to appeal from this decision will run from the time of the entry of the ultimate order and not from the date of this dictated oral decision. We have no further business. We're adjourned for today. Thank you. (Proceedings concluded at 11:47 AM) 

ı	Pg 39 01 40		
			39
1	INDEX		
2			
3	RULINGS		
4	DESCRIPTION	PAGE	LINE
5	Debtors' motion to reject lease or	7	24
6	executory contract granted		
7	Debtors' motion to reject unexpired leases	7	24
8	of nonresidential real property granted		
9	Debtors' amended second omnibus motion to	8	15
10	reject certain executory contracts granted		
11	Debtors' third omnibus motion to reject	9	25
12	certain executory contracts as to		
13	non-objecting parties granted		
14	Debtors' third omnibus motion to reject	30	15
15	certain executory contracts as to		
16	Stillwater Mining Company granted nunc pro		
17	tunc to date of the filing of the motion		
18			
19			
20			
21			
22			
23			
24			
25			

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